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 Reclaiming the streets
Black urban insurgency and antisocial security 
in twenty-fi rst-century Philadelphia
Jeff  Maskovsky
Abstract: Th is article focuses on the emergence of a new pattern of black urban 
insurgency emerging in major US metropolitan areas such as Philadelphia. I lo-
cate this pattern in the context of a new securitization regime that I call “antiso-
cial security.” Th is regime works by establishing a decentered system of high-tech 
forms of surveillance and monitory techniques. I highlight the dialectic between 
the extension of antisocial security apparatuses and techniques into new political 
and social domains on the one hand and the adoption of these same techniques 
by those contesting racialized exclusions from urban public space on the other. I 
end the article with a discussion of how we might adapt the commons concept to 
consider the centrality of race and racism to this new securitization regime. 
Keywords: commoning, inner city, race, securitization, United States, urban politics 
In Philadelphia, on 10 April 2013, dozens of Af-
rican American youth converged in what mu-
nicipal authorities described as a “fl ash mob” at 
the heart of the city’s central business district. 
Called together with the use of social media, 
these young people blocked traffi  c, massed on 
street corners, and ran down several city blocks 
until they were dispersed by the local police. 
Dozens of fl ash mobs, some involving hundreds 
of African American teens, took place in Phila-
delphia from 2009 to 2016.1 In response, politi-
cians and police offi  cials held press conferences 
during which they condemned participants for 
vandalizing property, shoplift ing, disrupting 
commerce, and violence. Th e local TV news 
broadcast sensationalized reports about “crazed 
teens,” “mob violence,” and “youth rioting.” 
In 2011, Philadelphia mayor Michael Nutter 
(2008–2016) criticized African American teens 
for participating in unruly gatherings in public 
spaces. From the pulpit of Mount Carmel Bap-
tist Church in West Philadelphia, where he is 
a member, he scolded: “You’ve damaged your-
self, you’ve damaged another person, you’ve 
damaged your peers and, quite honestly, you’ve 
damaged your own race” (quoted in John-Hall 
2011). In 2010, then City Council member Jim 
Kenney described the disruption caused by a 
gathering of African American teens as an act 
of “urban terrorism” (quoted in Owens 2017). 
40 | Jeff  Maskovsky
Nutter signed legislation stepping up police en-
forcement of teen curfews, while Kenney called 
for aggressive “zero tolerance” policing and 
steeper punishments for unruly teens. Kenney 
succeeded Nutter as mayor of Philadelphia in 
2016. 
I begin with this example of a moral panic 
over African American teen “fl ash mobs” to open 
a discussion of race, insurgent politics, and se-
curitization in Philadelphia. Broadly speaking, 
I am interested in how urban elites understand 
and enact security over public spaces, the strug-
gles that ensue when subordinated groups seek 
to occupy and reclaim public spaces in ways that 
disrupt and unsettle elite plans for their use, and 
how race politics shape these dynamics. More 
specifi cally, I am interested in the intersection 
of race, insurgent politics, and securitization in 
Philadelphia during the period from 2008 to 
2016 of what Jamie Peck (2012) calls “austerity 
urbanism.” In a context characterized by lean 
municipal government, new reductions in so-
cial-service delivery, reduced fi scal capacity, and 
austerity politics, the disruptive actions taken by 
African American youth are best understood, I 
argue, as an eff ort to reclaim urban public space, 
albeit fl eetingly, for those who have been labeled 
as “undesirable,” “pathological,” or a “threat” to 
Philadelphia’s future and who have thus been 
targeted by the city’s policing, surveillance, and 
legal apparatuses. 
In contrast to both popular and political 
discourses that emphasize black youth gath-
erings as antisocial criminal conduct, or that 
treat them as apolitical, I argue that they are a 
form of black urban insurgency. In Philadelphia 
and elsewhere, we have seen a recent uptick in 
acts of protest against the spatialized instanti-
ation of antiblack racism and violence, includ-
ing, of course, Black Lives Matter (BLM) and 
the Movement for Black Lives (MBL) (Camp 
and Heatherton 2016; Williams 2015; on race, 
place and space, see Brown 2009; Gregory 1998; 
Lipsitz 2007; Maskovsky 2006). Indeed, if “teen 
fl ash mobs” are a fi ction told by municipal elites 
and their supporters to obscure the spatialized 
eff ects of large-scale political economic change 
on urban African Americans (Massaro and 
Mullany 2011), then “turbulent crowd actions” 
involving African American teens should be 
understood, I think, as part of a broader protest 
landscape that is revolting against these arrange-
ments.2 Christian Ducomb and Jessica Benmen 
(2014) coin the term “turbulent crowd action” 
in an article that applies Latour’s actor-network 
theory to fl ash mob performances and that em-
phasizes both the historical continuities of con-
temporary actions with those from the past and 
the contingencies that shape crowd action; in 
contrast, I use the term to emphasize its nascent 
political potentialities for the present.
Central to this perspective is my framing of 
these actions also as a response in part to the 
rise of a new urban securitization and surveil-
lance regime that I call the regime of antisocial 
security. Th is regime is graft ing onto the ra-
cialized urban post-welfarism and the carceral 
turn of the late twentieth century a decentered 
surveillance and security system comprised 
of high-tech monitory procedures and hyper-
specifi c forms of mediatized surveillance. Anti -
social security is oriented not so much to 
maintain social order by segregation or fortifi -
cation but rather to surveil and police parts of 
the city—its downtown commercial districts 
mostly—that are diffi  cult to secure. Th ese are 
public spaces where the daily fl ow of people 
makes fortifi cation, citadelization, or ghettoiza-
tion logistically or politically diffi  cult in a post-
industrial context in which commercial activity 
dominates the urban core (cf. Marcuse 1998). 
What has emerged in these spaces, then, is a 
nimble form of securitization and surveillance 
that seeks to identify threats in racially diverse 
and socially inclusive spaces without impeding 
the movement and mobility of the people who 
are inhabiting them. At the same time, antisocial 
security also must work almost paradoxically to 
privilege elite groups of shoppers, workers, and 
residents; to racialize public space; and to subju-
gate urban African Americans and other people 
of color. Th is article sheds light on this paradox. 
It builds on scholarship on insurgency (Holston 
2009; Murphy 2015) and on securitization and 
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urban public space (Hall 1978; Holdbraad and 
Pedersen 2013; Low 2017; Low and Smith 2006; 
Maguire et al. 2014; Mitchell 2014) to explore 
the unique political and governmental chal-
lenges that antisocial security poses for urban 
African Americans on the one hand and the 
new forms of racial politics that contest its in-
stantiation and extension into new geographical 
and institutional spaces on the other hand. 
I focus on three related issues. First, I dis-
cuss in more detail what I mean by the regime 
of antisocial security and highlight how I see it 
reshaping the US urban core and its racial geog-
raphy, with Philadelphia serving as my primary 
example. Second, I analyze the new pattern of 
black urban insurgency and street protest that 
I see on the political horizon. In my discussion 
of insurgency, I bring into focus the “common-
ing” of parts of the new security apparatus as an 
essential aspect of attempts to resist new forms 
of racialized cultural, material, and spatial en-
closure (Ecologist 1993; Nonini 2007; Susser and 
Tonnelat 2013). I end the article with a critical 
discussion of the commons concept as an anti-
racist emancipatory rubric given the implica-
tions of the new securitization regime. I draw on 
ethnographic and historical evidence gathered 
through long-term fi eldwork conducted inter-
mittently in Philadelphia on race, class, civic life, 
and economic revitalization from 2000 to 2017 
to explore the intersection of race, insurgency, 
and securitization.3 An ethnographic investi-
gation of residents’ discourses and practices of 
insurgent politics and security illuminates the 
complexity of new power relations and political 
and governing imaginaries that are reshaping 
the urban core in cities like Philadelphia. 
Antisocial security: A new form 
of urban security 
In Philadelphia and other major metropolitan 
areas in the United States and elsewhere, racial-
ized policing practices are central to the order-
ing of public urban spaces and have long been 
intimately linked to the ordering functions of 
urban revitalization policies, commercial dis-
tricts, and neighborhood “quality of life” pro-
grams.4 Scholars in anthropology, geography, 
and other related fi elds tend to tie these devel-
opments closely to the rise of urban neoliber-
alism (Low and Smith 2006; Maskovsky 2006) 
and to the integration, post-9/11, of more co-
ercive, militarized policing and surveillance 
techniques into urban securitization schemes 
(Maskovsky and Cunningham 2009; Ruben 
and Maskovsky 2008; for a non-US example, 
see Goldstein 2010). Along these lines, in “Th e 
War on Teenage Terrorists: Philly’s ‘Flash Mob 
Riots’ and the Banality of Post-9/11 Securitiza-
tion,” feminist geographers Vanessa A. Massaro 
and Emma Gaalaas Mullaney (2011) describe 
the crackdown on public gatherings of African 
American youth in Philadelphia’s commercial 
districts as part of a wider pattern of post-9/11 
antiterrorist securitization, which they see as 
supporting the militarized enforcement of spa-
tial segregation and the defense of spaces for 
neoliberal capitalist development and commer-
cial consumption.5 By calling it banal, they are 
drawing on Cindi Katz’s notion of banal ter-
rorism, which, she writes, “embraces a theme 
about ‘us’—‘we’ are ‘threatened,’ ‘they’ hate/are 
jealous of ‘us,’ ‘we’ share a ‘homeland’—but it 
goes a step further as these notions about ‘us’ 
authorize and propel a common sense notion 
of ‘them’ as threat” (2007: 351). Broadening the 
critique of neoliberalism to include attention to 
the banality of illiberal measures that have been 
successively introduced from the War on Drugs 
to the War on Terror tells us a great deal about 
how fear of crime and of the disorderly street 
surface to justify and legitimate draconian po-
licing practices, the extension of urban security 
and surveillance apparatuses into new domains, 
the crackdown on public space, and the contin-
ued reinforcement of spatial segregation in the 
urban core more broadly, and in Philadelphia 
in particular with its long history of militarized 
police violence targeting African Americans 
(see, e.g., Massiah and Cade Bambara 2006).
I wish to extend this analysis by arguing that 
this ad hoc system of urban securitization and 
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surveillance is also enhanced by a system of 
“continuous control.” Th is is a formulation, fi rst 
elaborated by Gilles Deleuze in 1992 in “Post-
script on the Societies of Control,” in which 
people’s movements, ideas, spending, and hab-
its are tracked and monitored by “ultrarapid 
forms of free-fl oating control” (1992: 4). Roger 
Lancaster (2017), following Th omas Mathiesen 
(1997; see also Mathiesen 2013) calls this new 
regime of power “synopticism,” a variation on 
the modern disciplinary regime described by 
Michel Foucault that was inspired famously by 
Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon.6 If panopticism 
is characterized in the disciplinary societies of 
the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centu-
ries by the organization of vast spaces of enclo-
sure into factories, schools, families, hospitals, 
and prisons, synopticism is a form of power in 
which these disciplinary enclosures are criss-
crossed by “plural techniques” of surveillance 
that diff erentiate individuals from each other, 
sort people into categories of productive and 
unproductive personhood, and, importantly, 
single out pariahs who should be punished for 
violating aesthetic and moral principles that are 
diffi  cult to discern and unevenly applied. Unlike 
the carceral state, synopticism relies less on ex-
cessive punishment and militarized control and 
more on social media, texting, online search 
engines, electronic toll collection systems, cell 
phones, airport security screenings, body cam-
eras, fi tness trackers, antimalware soft ware, street 
cameras, and other seemingly benign forms of 
surveillance. 
Th e idea of a system of antisocial security 
rooted in synopticism is useful because it off ers 
an important corrective to more celebratory 
accounts of the wave of prison reform that has 
recently taken place across the United States, 
from the repeal of the Rockefeller Drug Laws 
in New York State (which inaugurated the con-
temporary period of post–civil rights era mass 
incarceration in 1973) to new kinds of exper-
imentation around prison reentry and other 
reforms that have moved criminal justice pol-
icy in less punitive directions during Barack 
Obama’s administration. Far from establishing 
a return to a more benevolent, rehabilitative, 
and less racist form of social control, I see the 
situation instead as one in which the system 
of surveillance is now so dense and so expan-
sive that incarceration, citadelization, contain-
ment, and ghettoization becomes less crucial to 
social control. To be sure, the existence of the 
carceral state that has penalized racialized pov-
erty and established an expansive criminal jus-
tice and prison system to warehouse the black 
poor is undeniable, as is the exercise of coercive 
control over the urban core across the United 
States (Wacquant 2009). Th ese trends are not 
disappearing anytime soon, as is evidenced, for 
example, by the immediate reversal of Obama-
era criminal justice reforms and the embrace of 
law and order policies by Donald Trump’s ad-
ministration. But surveillance capacities have 
become so sophisticated that diff erent kinds 
of individuals can now be tracked, managed, 
sorted, and, if necessary, criminalized or, at the 
very least, targeted for public humiliation and 
ridicule. Among the new pariahs are fl ash mob 
teens, sexual predators, teen sexters, suburban 
heroin addicts, goths and gamers turned possi-
ble school shooters, deluded ISIS sympathizers, 
and so on. Th ere is, of course, nothing unprec-
edented about moral panics over racialized and 
gender non-normative wayward youth and 
other pathologized threats. But the speed with 
which we move from one potentially threaten-
ing group to another, the level of detail we see 
streaming across our desks daily about the kinds 
of people who represent a new social threat, and 
the extent to which we invest in parsing out who 
is and who is not a threat and a social pariah 
is new, if not wholly unprecedented. And the 
kind of surveillance that allows this new threat 
matrix to become visible is profoundly antiso-
cial, in the sense that it is unconcerned with the 
questions of social cohesion and normalization 
and concerned instead with identifying, animat-
ing, and proliferating heterogeneous subjectivi-
ties whose relationships to a larger social whole 
are largely irrelevant to the new hegemonic or-
der. Th is articulation is concerned not with the 
social whole or the body politic but rather with 
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newer, more fl eeting and exclusive assemblages 
of people, positions, and practices.7 
Importantly, the system of continuous control 
that I describe here is by no means color-blind. 
Although it is not invested in maintaining the 
same kind of disciplinary control over black 
bodies that arose as a central feature of nine-
teenth- and twentieth-century panopticism, the 
instruments of surveillance that have coalesced 
into a system of continuous control were in 
many respects invented and honed through 
the historical eff ort to assert control over black 
bodies and neighborhoods, from slavery to Jim 
Crow to the post–civil rights era War on Drugs 
and mass incarceration. Th ey are therefore best 
understood as a refi ned set of surveillance in-
struments that are capable of sorting people in 
ways that reinforce racialized hierarchies and 
antiblack social and political prerogatives rather 
than as a system organized around color-blind 
cultural or political logics.
On the urban scale, in the United States and 
elsewhere, the surveillance technologies of the 
security state are increasingly integrated with 
those used in commerce and leisure spheres, 
creating a new multidirectional patterning of 
surveillance within and across urban enclosures. 
Corporate security forces have long cooperated 
with the police, and oft en act independently as 
well. Th e US government’s capacity to spy on 
Facebook accounts or read text messages or 
listen to telephone conversations has certainly 
generated a great deal of controversy. But it is 
only a small part of a broader, more expansive 
surveillance system that goes in all sorts of di-
rections so that the US government’s spying 
eff orts are linked in some ways to big data in-
formation-gathering techniques used by social 
media and technology fi rms. But, as anyone 
who uses Facebook knows, we are also spying 
on each other, on the government, and on tech-
nology companies. Deleuze argues that in the 
society of control, the primary mechanism of 
control is modulation, not enclosure. In this sit-
uation, controls are “like a self-deforming cast 
that will continuously change from one mo-
ment to the other, or like a sieve whose mesh 
will transmute from point to point” (1992: 4). 
Th is is precisely the kind of surveillance we have 
seen taking hold in Philadelphia’s downtown 
commercial corridors. In addition to imposing 
a curfew on teenagers, Philadelphia police also 
began monitoring social media and friending 
youth on Facebook and Twitter. Th ey ramped 
up the police presence at downtown intersec-
tions and forged a private sector partnership 
with commercial business owners, who were 
asked to notify the police if teens gather. Th e 
Philadelphia Police Department has also used 
“swarm” policing, a tactic borrowed from the 
military of advancing from every direction on 
a suspect or group of suspects, who are, in this 
case, teens congregating in a public space (Jer-
vis 2011). Taken together, these measures suture 
together a dense web of surveillance and secu-
rity activities that do not help to constitute a 
fortifi ed elite enclosure. Rather, they enable the 
commercial zones to remain porous and open 
even as they are densely surveilled synoptically.
Major shift s in the US political economy 
since the 1980s have shaped the pattern of an-
tisocial securitization aff ecting cities like Phil-
adelphia. In the urban United States, the rise of 
the new synoptic capacities that commerce and 
technology have enabled is linked closely with 
aspects of a new pattern of racialized capital-
ist socialization and authoritarian rule that has 
fragmented social and political alliances within 
and across the boundaries of race, class, gender, 
sexuality, and nationality. And it is precisely the 
situation of extreme economic inequality and 
political polarization and disaff ection that cre-
ates the condition in which continuous control, 
enacted horizontally as much as vertically, can 
fl ourish. 
At the level of political economy, a central 
feature of these antisocial articulations is the 
form of capitalist political economy since the 
1980s that is frequently glossed as neoliberal-
ism but, as Gavin Smith argues, is better un-
derstood as a shift  in the dominance of forms 
of capital from production to fi nance.8 Smith 
explains that the dominant class blocs in the pe-
riod dominated by fi nance capital have pursued 
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what he calls “selective hegemony,” which “re-
stricts the fi eld of negotiable politics to selected 
participants, so there is a sphere of action be-
yond such politics where no such negotiation is 
possible” (2011: 4–5). Outside of this restricted 
fi eld is an “absolute residual population” whose 
only recourse is counter-politics—the attempt 
to dismantle dominative and hegemonic power, 
not to negotiate with capital. Th e eff orts of Wall 
Street to control economic growth and gover-
nance introduced higher levels of volatility and 
crisis into the economy, requiring state-coordi-
nated upward wealth transfer repeatedly since 
the 1970s. Th e 2008 housing market meltdown 
is certainly the most exaggerated moment to 
date in this prolonged crisis—and the most bla-
tant bank rescue—but it follows on the heels 
of the collapse in the 1990s of the technology 
boom, the 1980s savings and loan disaster, and 
the two oil crises of the 1970s. Each of these cri-
sis moments combined with a sustained push to 
weaken labor power at the hands of capital and 
to require the economic sacrifi ce of major frac-
tions of the middle- and lower-classes at the altar 
of fi nance capital. And the new demographics 
of economic inequality and poverty that have 
accompanied these developments are now well 
documented, as are the new patterns of uneven 
urban development and of investment and dis-
investment in the urban core (Smith 2011).9 
Th is contrasts with a prior period of expansive 
hegemony during which diff erent populations 
were able to extract concessions by negotiating 
with capital for a stake in the political economy. 
Th ere is an inside/outside dynamic at play here 
in which fi nance-driven, profi t-making mech-
anisms and instruments are at once extremely 
complex and uncoordinated yet unifi ed by an 
elementary logic of expulsion (Sassen 2014).10
Extending this idea to capitalist racialization, 
we could also say that the current purportedly 
postracial period is marked by a parallel shift  
that is more selective than expansive, in the 
sense that a white elite is less concerned with 
securing the social order by maintaining a sta-
ble albeit hierarchalized racial order than it is in 
using race politics narrowly and strategically to 
disrupt challenges to its control. Th e leaders of 
fi nance are hostile to racial justice—they were 
brazenly predatory on black and Latinx com-
munities in the United States in the lead-up to 
the 2008 housing market collapse (Crump et 
al. 2008)—more so perhaps than other sectors 
of capital, while they were perfectly willing to 
engage in profi t-making schemes that devalued 
labor on a global scale, including that of white 
industrial workers in the metropolitan centers 
of the global north. Finance tends to oscillate 
between corporate multiculturalism and color 
blindness with a cavalier indiff erence. Th e aban-
donment of large segments of the white middle 
and working classes is fi ne in this situation of 
selective hegemony in the United States, but so 
too is a white racial project of enforcing fi nan-
cialized precarity on people of color. 
One obvious consequence of the exercise of 
fi nance-led selective hegemony is an increas-
ingly large absolute surplus population sorted 
into new fragmented and hierarchalized groups 
within the general category of the expelled, and 
a growing group who are trying desperately to 
hang on and prevent their own expulsion. Im-
portantly, expulsion and precaritization are 
not in themselves politically unifying develop-
ments. It is certainly useful to consider what is 
happening to, say, home mortgage defaulters in 
Florida and Arizona; the chronically underem-
ployed remnants of the once “affl  uent” white 
working class in Youngstown, Ohio; homeless 
people in San Francisco; Flint, Michigan, res-
idents poisoned by privatized water systems; 
undocumented laborers who are rounded up 
and deported in Chicago; African Americans 
harassed and murdered by police in Baltimore, 
Ferguson (Missouri), and New York City; stu-
dents of color in Philadelphia’s funding-starved 
schools; sick and injured farm animals in the 
Midwest. Or, to think beyond methodological 
nationalism and consider what is happening 
to migrant workers in the Americas or refu-
gees from the Middle East, as part of a global 
population of displaced, evicted, and dislocated 
people, cast out of professional livelihood, liv-
ing space, and even from life itself. However, 
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we cannot assume that this massive social, eco-
nomic, and political dislocation will catalyze 
mass counter-politics. On the liberal Left  in 
the United States, the hollowing out of an ex-
pansive hegemony into which disenfranchised 
groups could fi ght for entry and its replacement 
by selective hegemony, including the growth of 
an “absolute surplus population,” abandoned by 
capital and the state, has led some to argue for 
a new class universalism, an alignment of the 
ranks of disposable people in a new movement 
from below (Brecher et al. 2000; Frank 2004). 
Th e liberal-left  criticism of “identity politics” 
gained traction aft er Trump’s narrow electoral 
victory in November 2016. Th is entailed a push 
for a platform of economic populism that is dis-
dainful of cultural radicalism, which is viewed 
at best as a troublesome diversion from a new 
working-class politics and as thus a factor con-
tributing to the rise of economic inequality 
(see, e.g., the widely infl uential New York Times 
op-ed by Mark Lilla [2016]). 
But the liberal Left  desire for class solidarity 
ignores, of course, the concrete realities of race, 
gender, sexual, class, and national politics. It 
ignores religious and geographical diff erences 
within this expanding “absolute residual pop-
ulation.” It ignores the long, sordid history of 
white supremacy in which whites who shared 
economic interests with people of color sacri-
fi ced them to their religious, national, or racial 
interests. And it ignores the extent to which 
inequalities across race, gender, class, sexu-
ality, and nationality produce unequal power 
relation within the new disposable population, 
which is itself comprised of groups with distinct 
histories, grievances, and political sensibilities 
and sentiments. In other words, even as the 
disposable population expands, some people 
are still treated as—and feel—more disposable 
than others. In the United States, the rise of the 
Tea Party alongside the rise of BLM, Occupy 
Wall Street (OWS), and the immigrants’ rights 
movement—each with its own political reper-
toires and priorities and each with its own so-
cial bases—suggests that tensions and divisions 
within the disposable population of the United 
States are just as likely to intensify as the precar-
ious classes are likely to unite across diff erences 
and inequalities. In many ways, the political 
ascension of Donald Trump also complicates 
this picture, creating new political challenges 
for low-income people and people of color in 
general, but especially for those living in ur-
ban areas such as Philadelphia. Urban African 
Americans in Philadelphia and in other major 
metropolitan areas hold long-felt grievances 
against the liberal urban governing coalitions 
that are expert at reproducing political inequal-
ity along racial lines. Yet they have had little 
choice since the 1960s but to cast their lot with 
contemporary municipal elites. Th is dynamic 
intensifi ed with Trump’s electoral victory. Th e 
elitist politics of the municipal elite’s embrace 
of austerity urbanism are frequently elided by 
Trump’s vilifi cation of the cosmopolitan elite 
and by his opponents’ valorization of municipal 
areas as enlightened zones of liberal cosmopoli-
tanism, about which I will say more below. 
Unsurprisingly, a long-term crisis in political 
authority and legitimacy accompanies the rise 
of selective hegemony, and US political elites 
have had diffi  culty asserting a coherent strategy 
of rule even as the forces of reaction and au-
thoritarianism have grown since the 1980s. Th e 
authoritarian turn in the United States has been 
decades in the making. It should be remem-
bered that one of the most astute observations 
by Stuart Hall and his colleagues (1978) in Po-
licing the Crisis is that Th atcherite authoritarian 
populism emerged in a context of a prolonged 
and intensifying crisis of legitimacy of the 
postwar Labour-led governing coalition in the 
United Kingdom. In the United States, the cri-
sis of legitimacy plaguing the Democratic Party 
since the collapse of the New Deal has followed 
a similar path, and the politics of fear and re-
action—and of sentimentality more generally—
have fi lled the political void, even as they have 
garnered few fully committed supporters. 
In this situation, the centrality of antiblack-
ness and nativism to the new authoritarianism’s 
popular appeal is unsurprising. Th e authoritar-
ian projects that gain political traction in the 
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contemporary United States, like that of Trump, 
do so precisely because they are designed to ad-
dress questions of wealth distribution and social 
and economic mobility by infl aming xeno phobic 
and nativist passions and by discrediting black 
and brown political authority and accomplish-
ment (Maskovsky 2017). Yet everyday refusals to 
submit to political authority or to acknowledge 
the legitimacy of political elites are common-
place in Philadelphia and elsewhere, as diverse 
factions of the US urban pubic disengage from 
the political system, rage against Washington 
and sometimes against the indignities of state 
surveillance programs, and lampoon political 
authorities. In Philadelphia and elsewhere, the 
rise of the regime of antisocial security, with its 
selective hegemony and authoritarian dimen-
sions, may seem on the surface to disable anti-
racist politics. But it also created new grounds 
for black insurgent politics, to which I will now 
turn.
Black insurgent politics in Philadelphia
If the emerging regime of antisocial security 
saturates urban public space with surveillance 
and security measures and techniques, these 
eff orts have been of limited eff ectiveness in 
controlling black teen crowd action (Palmer 
and Farr 2017). One reason for this is that the 
very same surveillance technologies through 
which synoptic power condenses into a form 
of continuous control also enable new forms 
of sociality and unrest that challenge race and 
class hierarchies and the racialized control of 
urban space. Comprised of people who reside 
mostly in Philadelphia’s “outcast ghettos” (Mar-
cuse 1998), they nonetheless are not contained 
there and are mobile enough to come together 
in commercial areas. And the threat that they 
pose, and the reason therefore that they are so 
oft en trivialized by the mainstream media and 
by municipal elites as nonpolitical forms of 
senseless social disruption, is that teen crowd 
actions are, like riots, an expression of pub-
lic space occupation and reclamation by black 
youth who are widely viewed as inherently un-
governable, disorganized, and disruptive, and 
hence without any legitimate right to inhabit ur-
ban public space on this scale. Th e political dis-
ruptions caused by black youth in Philadelphia 
and other assertions of the right to occupy pub-
lic space by those who are putatively referred 
to as the “urban underclass” should thus not 
be underestimated or discounted. What makes 
these actions political is not just the disruption 
itself. It is also their persistence. Th ese actions 
have occurred frequently, if sporadically, since 
2009. Th ey have not stopped despite widespread 
condemnation by the municipal elite, including 
prominent leaders in the city’s African Ameri-
can community. And they have not stopped de-
spite a scaling up of surveillance and of policing 
measures designed to stop them. Th ese actions 
are also politically disruptive because in many 
instances participants engage in direct confl icts 
with police offi  cers, risking the violent reaction 
that these kinds of encounters frequently entail. 
Th ere is also a clear political message that can 
be discerned in what black teens themselves say 
about “fl ash mobs.”11 Billy Penn, a web-based 
news hub founded by a former Washington 
Post web editor, published an extensive exposé 
on fl ash mobs in Philadelphia. Cassie Owens 
(2017), the author of the piece, interviewed sev-
eral teens, who explained the participation of 
their peers in “fl ash mobs”: “I think they’re try-
ing to show off  in front of people,” said one. “I 
don’t know,” said another, “To get recognition. 
Th ey want to be cool.” By text, I asked a young 
woman I know why she participated in several 
“fl ash mobs” years ago when she lived in Phil-
adelphia. “To get out and be seen,” she texted 
back. Th ese responses suggest a politics of vis-
ibility—of gaining recognition by being looked 
at—that could be interpreted as an apolitical ex-
pression of youthful narcissism. But I speculate 
that it is more than this. For many years, urban 
African Americans have used technology to un-
settle long-term patterns of surveillance and po-
licing that helped to reshape the urban core, its 
retail sector, its residential neighborhoods, and 
its streets. Th e release of cell phone recordings 
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of police brutality and murder inspired protests 
across the country. Th e mainstream political 
response to these protests, and to the scandal 
of police misconduct and violence more gener-
ally, is the call for more body cameras for the 
police. Th is response exemplifi es precisely how 
synoptic power extends itself into new domains. 
Body cameras bring viewing and being viewed 
into new domains. Th ough not entirely unprec-
edented as a police accountability measure, an 
uncharted kind of viewing is being established 
here, as the police record what they do for oth-
ers to see. Th ere is no doubt that a great deal 
of magical thinking behind the idea that body 
cameras will somehow create the kind of unam-
biguous “evidence” necessary to either prove the 
police innocent or guilty of misconduct. As Ju-
dith Butler (1993) argued long ago about video 
evidence from the Rodney King beating, diff er-
ent interpretations of video footage are possible 
based on how the footage is framed for diff erent 
audiences, from liberal publics to juries that 
are tasked with the narrow legal responsibility 
to decide guilt or innocence to inner-city resi-
dents who live daily under the threat of police 
violence. Th e point here is not so much whether 
or not there is a preferable or “correct” reading 
of cell phone footage of police conduct, or of 
body camera footage. Th e point is that the ques-
tions “What is permissible? What is reasonable? 
What is just?” are increasingly framed in terms 
of “What looks permissible? What looks reason-
able? What looks just?” Th e political and ethical 
terrain is thus delimited more and more by the 
practice of looking, and patterns of inequal-
ity will be reinforced or contested in terms set 
by synoptic power. I think that young African 
Americans are aware of this. Th eir desire to be 
seen in urban public spaces where they are not 
permitted to congregate en masse is a political 
commentary of sorts. It is not just a refusal to be 
contained in the outcast ghettos to which they 
have been relegated. It is about the affi  rmative 
power of being seen, of being both in the city 
and of it. It is thus an insurgent expression of 
urban citizenship, one that also has national 
and global implications, as black youth circu-
late recordings of their crowd actions beyond 
their local communities. Surprisingly, synopti-
cism helps in this case to enable black insurgent 
politics. And this case resonates as well with 
the kind of insurgent politics that has been pi-
oneered by Black Lives Matter in Philadelphia 
and in other locations across the United States 
and elsewhere. BLM has famously refused to 
specify a list of concrete policy demands or 
policing reforms. Th is is in line with a similar 
refusal by OWS and by other insurgent groups. 
Pundits from many quarters criticize this re-
fusal as an indication of a lack of understanding 
about “how politics really works.” Yet there is 
another way to read this refusal: as an attempt to 
defend black communities and neighborhoods 
from violent, militarized intrusions by the se-
curity and surveillance apparatuses, an essential 
task that many BLM activists see as a fi rst step 
in a larger process of the reclaiming the streets, 
shops, and the city itself from the encompassing 
web of an ever-encroaching antiblack social or-
der. Indeed, BLM mobilizations are an assertion 
of sovereignty for African American individu-
als and communities that unsettles simplistic 
public and private divides and the liberal ortho-
doxies that promise better race relations via re-
formist attempts to fi x the welfare state or other 
pragmatic public policy solutions. More than 
just protests against the coercive power of the 
state (which presumably could be ameliorated 
by better policies), they represent a powerful 
critique of antiblackness, not just the racist and 
discriminatory practices associated with one 
branch of government or another, but of the 
centrality of black impoverishment and social 
and physical death to the white social order it-
self. In fact, the pervasiveness in diff erent politi-
cal quarters of the “all lives matter” or the “black 
labs matter” retort to BLM is quite clearly an 
attempt to make the protest against black social 
and physical death into an expression of reverse 
racism. And it is thus possible to see “all lives 
matter” and other similar retorts as a form of re-
vanchist politics that seeks to impose at the level 
of culture and ideology color-blind racism by 
masking white supremacy through the assertion 
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of white victimhood at the hands of purportedly 
entitled racial minorities. In both cases—“fl ash 
mobs” and BLM—there is an interesting dia-
lectic between seeing and being seen, looking 
and being looked at, security and insecurity that 
plays out in the battle over urban public space. 
As a black political activist in Philadelphia ex-
plained to me, “If you take the slogan, ‘Black 
Lives Matter’ at face value and even separate it 
from the Movement for Black Lives, black teens 
congregating in a downtown space outside of 
their home turf is a way of expressing the same 
thing—we matter, we exist, deal with us.”
Th is insurgent political sensibility is also 
reshaping black politics in Philadelphia. For 
the poorest African American Philadelphians, 
very little has changed in the past four decades, 
despite the political ascension of many black 
elected offi  cials and white liberal Democrats. 
From the point of view of many African Amer-
icans, the Offi  ce of the District Attorney has 
long been one of the most revanchist parts of 
city government, the fear-mongering, corrupt, 
and racist epicenter of the city’s law and order 
political establishment that has gone out of its 
way to criminalize black people to gain polit-
ical favor with white voters. On 17 May 2017, 
Larry Krasner won the Democratic primary. 
Krasner was a defense attorney who has been 
taking on civil rights cases for Black Lives Mat-
ter, Occupy Philadelphia, AIDS activists, and 
protesters arrested at political conventions. He 
ran a campaign against the death penalty and 
against the DA’s offi  ce, which he described as “a 
place with a mad zeal for the highest charge, for 
the highest level of conviction, a culture that can 
fi nd no fl aw in police misconduct, that is drunk 
on the death penalty” (quoted in Brennan and 
Terruso 2017). Krasner handily defeated six 
other candidates in the primary, including Tariq 
El-Shabazz, the only black candidate who was 
a fi rst assistant district attorney. Whereas Kras-
ner, a white progressive, worked as a defense and 
civil rights attorney and oft en defended African 
Americans against malicious prosecution and 
discriminatory policing practices, El-Shabazz 
was personally recruited to run by the former 
district attorney, who is under indictment for 
corruption and who implemented no criminal 
justice reforms during his two full terms in of-
fi ce. Members of Black Lives Matter supported 
Krasner’s candidacy, as did Color of Change, a 
national racial justice organization whose lead-
ership saw the Philadelphia district attorney’s 
race as ground zero for criminal justice reform 
in the United States. Color for Change estab-
lished a savvy social media–based Get Out the 
Vote operation in support of Krasner. During 
his campaign, Krasner vowed not to take cases 
brought by precincts that engage in the regular 
practice of stop-and-frisk, so Krasner gained 
the endorsement of several prominent radical 
black leaders. In the early 2000s and before, it 
would have been impossible in Philadelphia for 
a white politician running a radical platform 
to gain a signifi cant number of black votes for 
district attorney. Th is suggests not only that a 
sizable percentage of black Philadelphians are 
united in opposition to current criminal justice 
policies and are invested politically in reforming 
the legal, surveillance, and policy apparatuses 
in the city. It also indexes broad dissatisfaction 
with the liberal urban political establishment, 
including the black political establishment, on 
the part of many African American Philadel-
phians. Furthermore, at a moment when the lib-
eral urban political establishment is frequently 
celebrated at the national level as the cosmopol-
itan antidote to Trumpism, developments such 
as the political ascension of Larry Krasner point 
to a more complicated political situation, with 
class and race politics in major metropolitan 
areas working to unsettle the liberal cosmo-
politanism versus white nationalist Trumpism 
political logic that tends to undergird popular 
accounts of US politics. Indeed, careful atten-
tion to dynamics such as these reveals that large 
swathes of the urban electorate are dissatisfi ed 
with both options and that they assert their 
right to the city that contradicts the imperatives 
of austerity urbanism when they fi nd the oppor-
tunity to do so. 
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Conclusion: Antisocial security 
and the fate of the commons
In organizing this article around the theme of 
surveillance, I hope to encourage an analytical 
move beyond a simplistic domination/resistance 
paradigm to explore a new regime of antisocial 
security. Th e emphasis here is on the antisocial, 
individualizing ways that social groups and 
communities are carved up and how individ-
uals and groups are singled out, labeled as pa-
riahs, and disciplined in new and unexpected 
ways. Th is regime will create new modes of ra-
cial inequality and class division while it rein-
forces extant patterns. Th is is thus the regime to 
which black insurgent movements are learning 
to respond. 
Th e conceptual and political promise of 
the concept of black insurgent politics lies in 
its power to push beyond the class universal-
ism of the white Left  in the United States to 
help us to think through what kinds of social 
arrangements might adhere in a society that is 
not invested foundationally in black social and 
physical death. It pushes us to go beyond ques-
tions around what an anticapitalist commons 
might look like or what prefi gurative politics 
should look like today to ask what an antirac-
ist commons might look like. Indeed, there is 
no doubt that many of the commoning politics 
projects that exist today, or that have existed 
in the recent past, in the urban United States, 
have been exclusionary in ways that harm black 
urbanites. Proponents of the commons con-
cept therefore need to address race explicitly in 
their elaboration of equality, justice and collec-
tive stewardship (see, e.g., Harney and Moten 
2013). It is certainly possible to prioritize eff orts 
to establish forms of sociality, community, pro-
duction, cooperation, and resource stewardship 
and use that do not collude with racist logics 
and practices, are not indiff erent to black social 
and political death, and do not imperil black 
lives as an essential feature of their organiza-
tion. Although it is possible to imagine doing 
this alongside and to a certain extent in coop-
eration with the struggle to build anticapitalist 
commons, we should not assume that these two 
struggles are natural allies or that one should al-
ways be categorically subordinated to the other. 
At the same time, we should not presume that 
antiracist commoning will or should neces-
sarily be anticapitalist; nor can we assume that 
anticapitalist commoning will or should be an-
tiracist, though both eff orts, and many others, 
are vital means for working toward a nonracist, 
noncapitalist world. 
I wish to end with an additional comment on 
the adequacy of the commons as an emancipa-
tory rubric given the implications of antisocial 
security. If modulation, not enclosure, is the new 
means through which power will operate in the 
world today, then commoning must address the 
many dangers of a society of continuous control. 
Are the refusals by teen crowds, BLM and Phila-
delphia voters to follow the scripts provided by 
past movements and politics an attempt to resist 
enclosure and to reclaim public space and re-
sources in order to build commons, or are they 
aft er something else, something as yet unnamed 
that has less do to with establishing a common 
will and more to do with a form of political ac-
tion that can move rapidly from place to place, 
from person to person, group to group, to pro-
tect vulnerable and precarious people from the 
harsh, arbitrary and unjust gazes to which they 
are subjected?
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Notes
 1. Th e labeling of African American teen gath-
erings as “fl ash mobs” has also happened in 
Chicago and St. Louis, at the Wisconsin State 
Fair, and in other major metropolitan areas in 
the United States. For an excellent critical dis-
cussion of this labeling and its implications for 
post-9/11 antiterrorist securitization in Phila-
delphia, see Massaro and Mullaney (2011).
 2. Media reporting on “black fl ash mobs” is some-
what variable, refl ecting the highly partisan and 
polarized political cultures represented in the 
increasingly fragmented US public sphere (Di 
Leonardo 1998). Since 2010, most mainstream 
media coverage of “black fl ash mobs” in Phil-
adelphia emphasize the criminal conduct of 
the perpetrators and the violence or injuries 
that they cause, but they tend not to comment 
explicitly on race. In contrast, the right-wing 
media tends to describe the activities of black 
youth as racially motivated. For example, one 
Daily Wire article complained that the main-
stream media would not describe a “teen mob 
attack” on a bystander as an antiwhite hate 
crime (Bandler 2016). 
 3. I conducted two years of full-time ethnographic 
research focusing on the civic activities of res-
idents in a gentrifying neighborhood of Phil-
adelphia (2000–2002), aft er completing my 
dissertation focused on other arenas of urban 
activism (Maskovsky 2000). I returned to Phila-
delphia frequently from 2002 to 2017 and stayed 
in touch with informants who were involved in 
urban activism. My fi eldwork research relied 
principally on three ethnographic methods: par-
ticipant observation, open-ended interviews, 
and an in-depth life-history collection. I studied 
a wide array of activities involving urban activ-
ists and neighborhood residents as they vol-
unteered in nonprofi t and church-based soup 
kitchens, recovery programs, and job-training 
programs and as they organized around “quality 
of life” issues such as trash removal, the main-
tenance and upkeep of abandoned lots, and the 
construction of aff ordable housing. I collected 
data on the strategies and tactics residents used 
to distribute resources, access services, and at-
tract investment and paid close attention to how 
residents negotiate with each other, with city of-
fi cials, and with representatives from the corpo-
rate sector. My interview data provided insights 
into the contested terrain of community life, as 
residents revealed varied, oft en contradictory, 
visions of racial justice, community develop-
ment, resource mobilization, and neighborhood 
belonging. I also interviewed public offi  cials, 
developers, policy makers, consultants, profes-
sional staff  from nonprofi t organizations, and 
civic leaders. My life histories provided insights 
into activist trajectories, showing how personal 
histories of political involvement became a re-
source for contemporary political action. In my 
fi eld research, I paid close attention to the ways 
in which race, class, and gender shaped civic ac-
tion and was careful to collect data across these 
axes of diff erence. 
 4. For recent accounts of policing and securiti-
zation in Philadelphia, see Maskovsky (2006); 
Massaro and Mullaney (2011); and Ruben and 
Maskovsky (2008); the link of moral panics, po-
licing, race and class politics, and authoritarian 
populism is made by Hall (1978) in the classic 
Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law 
and Order. 
 5. See Ruben and Maskovsky (2008) for a parallel 
discussion of homeland securitization in Phila-
delphia; see Katz (2007) on banal terrorism and 
the performance of security in urban space. 
 6. Th e argument I develop here is inspired in large 
measure by Roger Lancaster’s (2017) brilliant 
new piece, “Th e New Pariahs: Sex, Crime and 
Punishment in America.” I extend his argument 
in a diff erent direction by emphasizing the con-
tinuing signifi cance of race and racism via the 
extension of synoptic power into new urban 
spaces. 
 7. To a certain extent, the argument I am making 
here follows Nikolas Rose’s (1996) argument 
about the “death of the social” as a key zone, 
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target, and objective of government under con-
ditions of globalization (for a critique of this 
position, see Clarke 2004). My emphasis, how-
ever, is not on the widespread reimagining and 
rescaling of governing practices down to the 
level of “community,” as Rose argues, but rather 
the narrow advent of a mobile and plural form 
of surveillance, enacted more through synoptic 
than panoptic power, that is invested in policing 
across disciplinary regimes such as the family, 
neighborhood, community, school, and public 
health apparatuses. Calling the kind of security 
that is imagined, if not fully obtained through 
these maneuvers, antisocial is meant to mark 
both the abandonment of social cohesion and 
social justice as the governmental logic of ur-
ban surveillance regimes and the simultaneous 
establishment of surveillance procedures and 
programs at various scales that cut across con-
ventional spatialized strategies of government. 
 8. Th e term “neoliberalism” has been useful in the 
past in capturing key governing dynamics that 
have emerged in conjunction with the global-
ization of the world economy since the 1980s. 
But recently, what is meant by the term has be-
come so imprecise that I wonder if it has lost 
most of its explanatory power (see Kingfi sher 
and Maskovsky 2008; Maskovsky and Brash 
2013).
 9. Incomes for middle-income whites have been 
fl at for more than three decades even if their 
economic situation remains better, on the 
whole, than that of blacks or Latinxs, especially 
aft er the 2008 economic collapse. Elite women 
have made employment inroads over the past 
three decades, but lower-income women have 
not (Massey 2009). Six out of ten poor adults 
are women, and six in ten poor children live in 
households headed by women.
10. For Sassen, fi nanciers and the managerial 
classes across the world may engage in similar 
kinds of brutal operations through which they 
savagely “sort” who will matter and who will 
be counted in the new metrics of productivity, 
profi tability, and growth on the one hand and 
who will be pushed to live (or die) at what Sas-
sen calls the “systematic edge.” But, for Sassen, 
elites and experts are not necessarily united in 
a concerted eff ort to expropriate and dispossess, 
for the complexity of the system makes it dif-
fi cult for them to see clearly the consequences 
of their actions: mass foreclosures, land grabs 
and displacement, forced migration, economic 
collapse, and environmental destruction on a 
global scale.
11. From January to May 2017, I attempted to 
contact several teens whom my activist infor-
mants or I knew had participated in a turbulent 
crowd action. One responded to me, by text, in 
mid-February 2017. 
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